Vanderbilt University Law School

Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2018

International Human Rights Law: An Unexpected
Threat to Peace
Ingrid Wuerth

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Ingrid Wuerth, International Human Rights Law: An Unexpected Threat to Peace, 101 Marquette Law Review. 803 (2018)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/889

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Marquette Law Review
Volume 101
Issue 3 Spring 2018

Article 6

International Human Rights Law: An Unexpected
Threat to Peace
Ingrid Wuerth

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons
Repository Citation
Ingrid Wuerth, International Human Rights Law: An Unexpected Threat to Peace, 101 Marq. L. Rev. 803 (2018).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol101/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized editor of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

WUERTH - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/4/18 11:29 AM

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: AN
UNEXPECTED THREAT TO PEACE
INGRID WUERTH*
I. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE AND THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER ........................................................................................ 806
II. HAS IT WORKED?.................................................................................. 807
III. CONTEMPORARY THREATS .................................................................. 809
A. Relaxing International Law’s Prohibition on the Use of Force .. 810
1. Georgia and Crimea.............................................................. 811
2. Syria .................................................................................... 812
B. Sidelining and Weakening the U.N. Security Council ............... 813
C. Human Rights: Making International Law Weaker? ................. 815
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 818
It is a great honor to deliver this lecture in honor of the late Dean Robert F.
Boden. I am grateful to all of you for attending. My topic tonight is
international law and peace among nations. It may seem a poor fit for a lecture
honoring Dean Boden. I did not know him, but I have read that Dean Boden
was passionately dedicated to teaching law students about the actual day-to-day
practice of law. He believed that law schools should be focused on that sort of
professional training—not on policy questions or preparing students to be
“architects of society,” as one of his successors characterized his views.1
International law involves lots of policy. And some international law
involves structuring or building a global society of sorts. Yet it also demands
outstanding technical lawyers—the very ones that we train, you at Marquette
and I at Vanderbilt. Beyond that, international law addresses many topics about
which lawyers and other leaders in Milwaukee and Nashville should be
educated, even passionate. Those include my topic tonight. So I think that
Dean Boden would approve.
In all events, the importance of peace among nations is clear as we look
back in history to the devastating losses of World Wars I and II and as we look
forward and contemplate the possibility of nuclear conflict with Iran or North

* Helen Strong Curry Chair in International Law, Vanderbilt Law School. For excellent research
assistance, I am grateful to Weike Guo.
1. Howard B. Eisenberg, Why We Honor Robert F. Boden, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997).

WUERTH - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

804

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

5/4/18 11:29 AM

[101:803

Korea, or the possibility of a maritime war with China, or war with Russia in
Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Many foreign policy experts size up the world
today and conclude that the risk of a major interstate war is significant and
growing.
One threat comes from what has been termed “Thucydides’s Trap,” named
after the ancient Greek historian of the Peloponnesian War.2 Thucydides
argued that the rise of Athens and the fear this instilled in Sparta, the dominant
power of the time, made war inevitable.3 And it has not been just Sparta and
Athens. Looking over the past 500 years, scholar Graham Allison has argued
that when a power rises quickly and threatens to displace a ruling power, the
most likely outcome historically is war.4 The key variable is a rapid shift in the
balance of power, generally measured by relative gross domestic product and
military strength. Twelve of the 16 cases in which this occurred in the past 500
years ended violently.5
Today, this threat is posed by China, whose dramatic economic growth
threatens to displace the dominant power: the United States. Indeed, on some
economic measures, it has already done so.6 China is also making tremendous
investments in its military, narrowing the gap between itself and the United
States.7 History suggests that this pattern is a dangerous one.
Beyond the specifics of Thucydides’s Trap, both China and Russia are
revisionist powers—meaning that they are unhappy with the global distribution
of power and would like to restore regional dominance. Robert Kagan, of the
Brookings Institution and formerly of the State Department, warns that we
might be “[b]acking into World War III.”8 Some of the Chinese and Russian
ambition is territorial—as in the East and South China Seas for the former and

2. GRAHAM ALLISON, DESTINED FOR WAR: CAN AMERICA AND CHINA ESCAPE THUCYDIDES’S
TRAP?, 27–29 (2017).
3. Id. at 39–40.
4. See generally id.
5. Id. at 41.
6. See GDP Based on PPP, Share of World, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/USA/CHN [https://perma.cc/FP2G-ZSLY]
(last visited Dec. 17, 2017) (comparing the United States and China); Real GDP Growth, INT’L
MONETARY
FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/USA/CHN
[https://perma.cc/4JKQ-98ST] (last visited Dec. 17, 2017) (same).
7. See ERIC HEGINBOTHAM ET AL., THE U.S.-CHINA MILITARY S CORECARD: FORCES,
GEOGRAPHY, AND THE EVOLVING BALANCE OF POWER, 1996–2017, at 21 (2015),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html [https://perma.cc/M5ML-XQMG].
8. Robert Kagan, Backing Into World War III, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 6, 2017),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/
[https://perma.cc/Z7EF-4MTM].
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in Ukraine and Eastern Europe for the latter.9 China and Russia both view
themselves as victims of hegemonic power wielded by the West, in particular
by legal power exercised through international law, sometimes in the form of
unfair treaties—or, to use the term made popular in the Ottoman Empire,
“capitulations.”10
Both China and Russia perceive the liberal post-war order in general, and
the United States in particular, as thwarting their objectives. At the same time,
Kagan argues, the United States and the West have a declining will and ability
to maintain the dominant place that they have held in the international system
since 1945.11
Other foreign policy experts argue that, despite their differences, American
liberals and conservatives shared three basic foreign policy principles in the
post-World War II era: faith in democracy; belief that America’s security is
enhanced by its broad and deep alliances around the world; and confidence that
open trade brings global prosperity.12 A retreat from these post-World War II
values means that the risk of war grows, some have warned.13
But there is some good news: Despite these threats and even gathering
storm clouds, today we continue to live in a period dubbed “The Long Peace”—
meaning the post-World War II period in which there has been a dramatic

9. Jeremy Bender, Russia’s New Military Doctrine Shows Putin’s Geopolitical Ambitions, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 12, 2015, 1:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-has-a-new-militarydoctrine-2015-1 [https://perma.cc/V6HK-VQNV]; Ryan M. Scoville, A Defense of Japanese
Sovereignty Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 46 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 571, 572 (2014); see also
JAMES D. J. BROWN, JAPAN, RUSSIA AND THEIR TERRITORIAL DISPUTE: THE NORTHERN DELUSION
53, 58–61, 64 (2016).
10. PHIL C.W. CHAN, CHINA, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 16
(2015); Lauri Mälksoo, Russia and China Challenge the Western Hegemony in the Interpretation of
International Law, EJIL: TALK! (July 15, 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/russia-and-china-challengethe-western-hegemony-in-the-interpretation-of-international-law/#more-14441
[https://perma.cc/U5C3-9U9G]; TURAN KAYAOĞLU, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: SOVEREIGNTY AND
EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, AND CHINA 155 (2010); see also NASIM
SOUSA, THE CAPITULATORY REGIME OF TURKEY: ITS HISTORY, ORIGIN, AND NATURE, at ix–x (1933).
11. Kagan, supra note 8.
12. Jessica T. Mathews, What Trump Is Throwing Out the Window, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Feb.
9, 2017), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/02/09/what-trump-is-throwing-out-the-window/
[https://perma.cc/NVF5-5BTK].
13. Fareed Zakaria, FDR Started the Long Peace. Under Trump, it May be Coming to an End,
WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/fdr-startedthe-long-peace-under-trump-it-may-be-coming-to-an-end/2017/01/26/2f0835e2-e402-11e6-ba1163c4b4fb5a63_story.html?utm_term=.2f31e7f7af18 [https://perma.cc/B6R4-55CF].
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reduction in armed conflict between nation-states, especially among great
powers.14
During that same period—indeed, extending further back to the end of
World War I—a central, overarching goal of international law has been the
eradication of interstate war.15 The place or the role of international law in
creating and sustaining the Long Peace is neither straightforward nor
uncontested, but there are strong reasons to think that international law has
helped generate that peace. Unfortunately, the features of international law
most likely to have contributed to peace are today under threat, in part from
unexpected quarters.
Here I wish to briefly describe the international law designed to limit
interstate armed conflict. Then I will offer an evaluation of whether and how
international law has been successful at preventing interstate armed conflict.
My last (and longest) topic addresses current threats to peace that come from
changes in international law.
I.

PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Following the devastation of World War I, the Covenant of the League of
Nations sought to prevent war by requiring member states to use a compulsory
system of dispute resolution.16 But the covenant did not prohibit war outright.
In fact, war was still permitted as a method of interstate dispute resolution, just
as it had been for centuries.17
The Kellogg–Briand Pact of 1928 changed this. With this pact, or treaty,
countries pledged that the “solution of all disputes” which might arise between
them “shall never be sought except by pacific means.”18 That pact, which came
about in large part because of the efforts of a visionary corporate lawyer from
the Midwest named Salmon Levinson,19 was not an immediate success. Indeed,
just a decade later, World War II began. And it was started by the very countries
that had signed the Kellogg–Briand Pact.

14. See JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE LONG PEACE: INQUIRIES INTO THE HISTORY OF THE COLD
WAR 245 (1987); STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS
DECLINED 251 (2011).
15. See STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 5, 335
(2005).
16. Covenant of the League of Nations art. 12.
17. See id.; NEFF, supra note 15, at 3–5.
18. Kellogg-Briand Pact art. 2, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 2346.
19. See, e.g., OONA A. HATHAWAY & S COTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A
RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD 106–30 (2017).
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So much for international law—for a while. As World War II raged, U.S.
lawyers and diplomats worked again to end war for all time, now by drafting
what would become the Charter of the United Nations.
The United Nations Charter has as its centerpiece a prohibition on the use
of force: Article 2(4), which forbids the “threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”20 The charter makes
exceptions for self-defense and for uses of force authorized by the United
Nations Security Council.21 The Security Council has the power to enforce the
prohibition on the use of force through coercive measures, but the victors of
World War II have the power to veto any such measures.22 Those countries are
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.23 Unlike
the failed League of Nations, the United Nations has near-universal
membership.
Today the United Nations has an enormous agenda of worthy causes, from
protecting human rights to combating diseases such as AIDS. It is easy to forget
that at its inception, its core purpose was to prevent war. Those drafting the
charter rejected, for example, language that would have made human rights
obligations legally binding.24
II. HAS IT WORKED?
So now for the second matter: Has it worked? As I have already said, we
are today in a period that has been dubbed the Long Peace, meaning the postWorld War II period in which there has been a dramatic reduction in armed
conflict between nation-states, particularly in conflicts involving the world’s
great powers.25 But the precise role of international law in reducing interstate
armed conflict is not clear. To begin with, there are questions about how
international law is enforced—why, in other words, would it be effective? We
will return to that point. Also, factors other than international law have
unquestionably contributed to peace among nations; these likely include
economic integration and development, the advent of nuclear weapons, and
changing norms of human behavior.26

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
U.N. Charter art. 51, art. 44.
U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 3.
U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1.
See Bertrand G. Ramcharan, Norms and Machinery, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE
UNITED NATIONS 439, 441–42 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2007).
25. See GADDIS, supra note 14, at 245; PINKER, supra note 14, at 189–294.
26. See PINKER, supra note 14.
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We do know that during this long peaceful period, territorial conquests,
now outlawed by international law, have been curtailed. One recent study, a
book by Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, argues that in the years before
World War II, an average state could expect one conquest in a human life span.
Since World War II, an average state can expect some kind of territorial
conquest once or twice a millennium.27 The period between 1928, when the
Kellogg–Briand Pact took effect, and the end of World War II obviously
involved lots of territorial conquests, suggesting that international law did not
work.
In the end, however, most of those conquests were reversed. Why? The
same study argues that the acquisition of territory by force violated international
law after 1928, so that those conquests were not recognized by other nations
and were eventually reversed, a pattern we do not see before 1928.28 Note that
if Hathaway and Shapiro are correct, a Midwestern corporate lawyer trained in
law at Lake Forest College had the vision and determination to push through a
treaty that had a transformative effect on world affairs.
Some are skeptical about the importance of 1928 and the Kellogg–Briand
Pact, however, especially in light of the devastation of World War II that
followed. It is clear that some forms of territorial conquests have declined since
the late 1940s when the U.N. Charter came into effect, with its prohibition on
the use of force.29 But, as I have said, factors other than international law may
have worked to generate peace among nations. Various empirical studies do
show a relationship between international law and some aspects of territorial
disputes,30 although proving causation is, again, difficult.
27. HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 19, at 314. But see Michael J. Glennon, How Not to
End War, LAWFARE (Oct. 18, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-not-end-war
[https://perma.cc/BWR8-6G5D] (book review).
28. HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 19, at 315.
29. See PINKER, supra note 14, at 251–52; TANISHA M. FAZAL, STATE DEATH: THE POLITICS
AND GEOGRAPHY OF CONQUEST, OCCUPATION, AND ANNEXATION 169–228 (2007).
30. See, e.g., Paul F. Diehl & David Bowden, Law and Legitimacy in Territorial Changes, 32
CONN. J. INT’L L. 49, 64–65, 69 (2016) (finding that under certain circumstances legal agreements
involving territorial changes tended to lessen violent conflict and reduce ongoing territorial claims,
especially in the period after 1945); Paul K. Huth et al., Does International Law Promote the Peaceful
Settlement of International Disputes? Evidence from the Study of Territorial Conflicts since 1945, 105
AM. POL. S CI. REV. 415, 416 (2011) (finding, in a study of territorial disputes from 1945 to 2000,
“strong support for our hypotheses regarding the pacifying effect of international law” with respect to
territorial disputes, at least when the legal principles are clear and provide a clear advantage to one
side). But cf. Paul R. Hensel et al., Territorial Integrity Treaties and Armed Conflict Over Territory,
26 CONFLICT MGMT. AND PEACE SCI. 120, 139–40 (2009) (finding that territorial integrity norms in
treaties have not been as effective at reducing armed conflict as some have argued, but finding that
treaties which impose a general obligation to respect territorial integrity are associated with a
significant decrease in territorial conflict).
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Let us approach the question from a different angle. Putting aside
international law for a moment, what do we know about the causes of war? The
empirical data make two things clear: (1) War is most likely to occur when
countries have disagreements about territory, and (2) war is least likely to occur
between democracies.31 These two findings are called the “territorial peace”
and the “democratic peace,” respectively. I will focus on the former.
The territorial-peace literature tells us that if international law reduces
conflict over territory, it should improve the likelihood of peace among nations.
Indeed, reducing conflict over territory appears more likely to prevent armed
conflict than does reducing economic or political conflict.32 This is an
important finding: It means that to the extent international law is designed to
limit territorial conflict, it is aiming at the correct target in terms of securing
peace. And, as we have partly seen, international law has put in place a variety
of mechanisms to reduce conflict over territory, including not just Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter and the ban on conquests but also a host of treaties and
doctrinal rules designed to preserve the sanctity of borders and institutions
tasked with reducing conflict over them.
If these legal rules and institutions make territorial conflict more costly to
states—which they unquestionably do, even if we do not know how costly—
then at a minimum they reduce the incentives to engage in conflict over
territory. This, in turn, is strongly correlated with peace. To be clear, this
reasoning does not prove that international law has generated the Long Peace.
Rather, it says that territorial conflict is strongly associated with military
disputes; that international law is designed to reduce conflict over territory; and
that, as those international norms generally solidified, some forms of territorial
conflicts have in fact declined.
Against that backdrop, let’s turn now to our central topic: contemporary
threats.
III. CONTEMPORARY THREATS
Although the data we have strongly suggest that the international legal
system has contributed to the prevention of some kinds of armed conflict, today

31. DOUGLAS M. GIBLER, THE TERRITORIAL PEACE: BORDERS, STATE DEVELOPMENT, AND
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 2–3 (2012); PAUL K. HUTH & TODD L. ALLEE, 82 CAMBRIDGE STUDIES
IN INT’L RELATIONS, THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND TERRITORIAL CONFLICT IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 1 (2002).
32. GARY GOERTZ ET AL., THE PUZZLE OF PEACE: THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 82, 89 (2016).
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peace among nations is under threat from both geopolitical and legal forces.33
We have already discussed the geopolitical threats.
What of the threats that come from changes in the international legal
system? Here you may expect me to explain how President Donald J. Trump
has undermined international law. In fact, I don’t think he has (yet at least),
with one exception. My target is elsewhere, somewhere you are probably not
expecting: human rights.
The post-World War II international legal order has been characterized by
the Long Peace, but also by the rise of international human rights law,
especially since the 1970s. Human rights have purported to transform
international law, in part by changing the definition of “state sovereignty” to
mean not merely effective control over territory but also the use of state power
to protect and promote individual human rights.34
The idea is powerful: States are not fully sovereign when they are violating
human rights. Powerful, but with potentially deleterious effects for other
international legal norms.
A. Relaxing International Law’s Prohibition on the Use of Force
The transformation of state sovereignty to include respect for human rights
led to an explicit call for the use of external force to prevent widespread human
rights violations, sometimes called “humanitarian intervention” or (with
slightly different content) the “responsibility to protect” (R2P).
The doctrine rose to prominence during and after the 1999 NATO bombing
of Kosovo ordered by President Bill Clinton. The bombing was for
humanitarian purposes—not, the United States said, for territorial conquest.
The action violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter but was defended by a few
countries and by many individuals as legal on the ground that it served to protect
and promote the human rights of Kosovar Albanians.35
The U.N. Security Council was unable to act because Russia, with its
permanent member’s veto, was a longtime ally of Serbia, in which Kosovo was
located. China and Russia argued that the unrest in Kosovo was a domestic
issue, not one justifying international intervention.36 These events led to an
extensive debate about the wisdom and the legality of humanitarian
intervention lacking either U.N. Security Council approval or the consent of the
33. See supra Part II.
34. See STEVEN R. RATNER, THE THIN JUSTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A MORAL
RECKONING OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 126–27 (2015) (describing views).
35. See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 628, 633–34 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 1999).
36. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg. at 5, 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3989 (Mar. 26, 1999).
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territorial state. Russia vehemently protested the NATO action, characterizing
it as “a gross violation of the United Nations Charter and other basic norms of
international law”37—one illustrating that “[t]he virus of lawlessness is
spreading to ever more spheres of international relations” and undermining the
“capacity of the Security Council to defend the United Nations Charter.”38
China condemned NATO’s intervention for exactly the same reasons.39
The Kosovo intervention, however well-intentioned (and remember, from
Russia’s perspective, it was not well-intentioned), has had destabilizing
ramifications. The bombing campaign led eventually to Kosovo’s declaration
of independence from Serbia in 2008. Not surprisingly, Serbia and its allies,
especially Russia, condemned the declaration of independence and do not
recognize Kosovo as a nation-state,40 even today, meaning that Kosovo will not
become a member of the United Nations any time soon.
1. Georgia and Crimea
Kosovo set a precedent for bypassing the U.N. Security Council and Article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter by one purportedly acting for humanitarian purposes.
Despite its vehement disagreement with the Kosovo action, Russia eventually
welcomed that precedent—citing it to justify Russia’s use of force in both
Georgia and Ukraine. Crimea, which was once part of Ukraine, is today
Russian.
Official Russian explanations for the actions against Georgia and Ukraine
made clear references to precedent set by NATO in Kosovo. Russia said, in
each case, that it was acting to protect a Russian minority from human rights
violations at the hands of the Georgian and Ukrainian government.41 Note that
many people in Russia and even in the West did not condemn this analogy.42
Although sanctions have been imposed on Russia in response to the annexation
of Crimea, popular support for Putin’s handling of the situation in Ukraine

37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at 5–6.
39. Id. at 9.
40. Serbia, Russia Fury as Kosovo Independence Draws Near, EURACTIV (Feb. 15, 2008),
https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/serbia-russia-fury-as-kosovo-independencedraws-near/ [https://perma.cc/P6L8-MZYF].
41. See David M. Herszenhorn, Crimea Votes to Secede from Ukraine as Russian Troops Keep
Watch, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2014, at A8.
42. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, The Precedential Value of the Kosovo Non-Precedent Precedent
for Crimea, LAWFARE (Mar. 17, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/precedential-valuekosovo-non-precedent-precedent-crimea [https://perma.cc/7VSS-CB2Q].
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remains very high among Russians.43 To domestic audiences, Putin
emphasized that Western countries’ interventions in Kosovo and in Libya in
2011 were conducted under “the false pretense of a humanitarian
intervention.”44 His emphasis on the international legal basis for Russian
actions in Ukraine shows his belief that the action would be more popular at
home, and therefore, less costly to his government and to Russia’s interests, if
it were viewed as consistent with international legal norms.
Today, the primary threat to peace with Russia is the increasingly
militarized borders between NATO (or NATO-allied) countries and Russia—
the area where thousands of NATO troops, the most since the end of the Cold
War, are stationed.45
In the context of Georgia and Ukraine, humanitarian intervention has thus
helped generate conflict over territory by reducing the costs of intervention that
can be termed “humanitarian.” And the literature about the territorial peace
tells us that territorial disputes have historically been most likely to lead to
militarized conflict.
2. Syria
President Trump’s airstrikes in Syria have further contributed to the erosion
of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. You will recall that in April 2017, acting
without U.N. Security Council authorization, President Trump ordered
airstrikes in response to Syria’s use of chemical weapons—a deplorable and
horrific act by Syria, to be sure. Unlike the bombing of Kosovo, the Syrian
airstrikes were not the effort of a regional security organization such as NATO.
They were not multilateral but unilateral.
Supporters of President Trump’s actions from across the political
spectrum—and there were many46—defended the strikes as consistent with
international law, arguing that Article 2(4) of the charter needs to be updated.

43. Public Opinion in Russia: Russians’ Attitudes on Economic and Domestic Issues, APNORC, http://www.apnorc.org/projects/Pages/HTML%20Reports/public-opinion-in-russia-russiansattitudes-on-the-economic-and-domestic-issues-issue-brief.aspx [https://perma.cc/3GF8-6YXU] (last
visited Mar. 16, 2018).
44. See Steven Lee Myers & Ellen Barry, Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and Bitterly
Denounces the West, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2014, at A1.
45. See Tom O’Connor, U.S. Military Sends Troops to Russian Border, Officials Say They Want
‘Peace,
Not
War’
with
Russia,
NEWSWEEK
(Oct.
12,
2017,
3:40
PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/russia-us-broke-nato-peace-treaty-possible-military-response-683526
[https://perma.cc/4AQ6-M7YA].
46. See Perry Bacon Jr., Most Senators Support Trump’s Syria Airstrike, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Apr. 7, 2017, 3:27 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/a-clear-majority-of-senators-supporttrumps-syria-airstrike/ [https://perma.cc/THW9-ER3C].
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We need, according to this view, a more nuanced approach to the use of force
under international law, one that is carefully calibrated to permit the use of force
in response to humanitarian atrocities.47
But we must be clear about the risks. Perhaps the degradation of the U.N.
Charter-based limitations will weaken the international law prohibitions on the
use of force, making regional or global conflict with China, North Korea, and
Russia more likely. Today, the South China Sea is often cited as the world’s
leading conflict-prone area. And a border dispute between China and India
continues to simmer.
China, in turn, was unusually and in fact alarmingly restrained in its
comments about the Syrian airstrikes. Breaking from past practice, China did
not directly criticize U.S. airstrikes in Syria as violating international law.48
Why not? Perhaps China’s territorial ambitions in the South China Sea mean
that it has begun to see Article 2(4) as hindering its foreign-policy objectives.
Many in the West assume that we—meaning the West—can set the rules
for the appropriate departures from Article 2(4). Russia has made clear in
Eastern Europe that it will use those departures to its own ends. China may be
next.
Recall that the theoretical basis for these actions is the transformation of
sovereignty to include protection for human rights. China and Russia view that
purported transformation as an illegitimate effort to deny them the full benefits
of sovereignty—to change the rules of the game, if you will, to remake
sovereignty in a way that favors Western political order.
Now for the second threat.
B. Sidelining and Weakening the U.N. Security Council
The use of force in Syria, Ukraine, and Kosovo, all in the name of human
rights and humanitarian ambitions, also served to undermine the authority of
the United Nations Security Council, as I have already mentioned, and as China
and Russia have lamented.
Note, however, that the Security Council is a key forum for resolving other
threats to interstate peace, such as Iran and North Korea. China, which is key
to containing North Korea, highlights its constructive role in developing the
U.N. Security Council resolutions designed to deter North Korean nuclear and
47. See Harold Hongju Koh, Not Illegal: But Now the Hard Part Begins, JUST SECURITY (Apr.
7, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39695/illegal-hard-part-begins/ [https://perma.cc/EX7LCXVC].
48. See Julian Ku, China’s Surprising Refusal to Criticize the Legality of the U.S. Attack on
Syria, LAWFARE (Apr. 7, 2017, 7:44 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/chinas-surprising-refusal-criticizelegality-us-attack-syria [https://perma.cc/B3MW-RFNT].
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missile programs.49 After all, it is international law that provides the basis for
imposing sanctions on North Korea to limit its nuclear ambitions in the first
place. The United States returns to the Security Council when it wants to
impose sanctions against North Korea. Undermining the U.N. Charter and
weakening the U.N. Security Council in the context of human rights make it
more difficult to achieve these other objectives.
In the case of Iran, too, the U.N. Security Council is important to realizing
U.S. goals, and international law as a whole supports the U.S. policy objectives
of preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran. Sanctions imposed
by the U.N. Security Council led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action, which relaxed sanctions in return for Iranian concessions on its nuclear
program.50 Undermining the U.N. Security Council makes peace more difficult
to achieve in this context as well.
The human-rights-based doctrine of humanitarian intervention allows states
to sideline the U.N. Security Council, as we have seen. But there are other ways
that human rights may have had deleterious effects on the U.N. Security
Council. The Security Council’s mandate has grown over the years to include
more and more matters related to human rights. With that growth come two
problems: heightened expectations that go unfulfilled (“credibility costs”) and
greater perceptions of selectivity and bias (“polarization costs”).51
Let me focus on one example: Libya.
In the case of the 2011 airstrikes in Libya, the U.N. Security Council
authorized the use of force to protect civilians from the threat of massive human
rights violations. Russia and China abstained from (but did not veto) the
relevant Security Council resolution.
Air strikes in Libya were ultimately used by NATO to help the Libyan
rebels oust Qaddafi—again, in the name of human rights.52 The regime-change
aspect of the intervention appeared to many countries to be the use of human
rights and humanitarian issues as a smokescreen for the removal of Qaddafi, a

49. Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China, Address to the China Dev.
Forum: Work Together to Build Partnerships and Pursue Peace and Development (Mar. 20, 2017).
50. See S.C. Res. 2231, ¶ 7 (July 20, 2015).
51. For a longer discussion of these costs see Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the PostHuman Rights Era, 96 TEX. L. REV. 279, 311–19, 333–37 (2017).
52. President Obama said, “The dark shadow of tyranny has been lifted. And with this enormous
promise, the Libyan people now have a great responsibility -- to build an inclusive and tolerant and
democratic Libya that stands as the ultimate rebuke to Qaddafi’s dictatorship.” Remarks by President
Obama on the Death of Muammar Qaddafi (Oct. 20, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2011/10/20/remarks-president-death-muammar-qaddafi [https://perma.cc/X8FZ-8NHE].
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result explicitly desired by the West.53 As one writer put it, the use of force in
Libya “fueled speculations as to which other countries are also likely candidates
for intervention” by Western countries.54
Cooperation between Russia and Western countries on other issues became
more difficult. Consider this alarming example: When Russia effectively
annexed Crimea, many nations in the United Nations General Assembly refused
to condemn this obvious violation of international law. Why? They saw it as
justified payback for the West’s selective enforcement of human rights law in
Kosovo and even in Iraq—a war also justified in part based on human rights.
This kind of response is consistent with the work of behavioral law and
economics scholars who argue that states will be less willing to enforce
international law if they perceive it as biased and unfair.55 Beyond just Libya,
human rights norms cover so many topics and are so widely unenforced that
perceptions of bias abound.
The U.N.’s actions with respect to Libya also led to credibility costs. Note
that at the same time as the intervention in Libya moved forward, the Syrian
government was using increasingly violent measures to quell domestic unrest.
The Syrian conflict escalated into a civil war, killing hundreds of thousands of
people. But the Security Council was unable to take meaningful action. The
expanded mandate of the Security Council over mass atrocities and other
human rights violations creates a credibility problem when the council is
hamstrung by political differences and, accordingly, cannot act in response to
massive atrocities in violation of human rights law.56
Let’s turn to the third threat.
C. Human Rights: Making International Law Weaker?
The problems that human rights have created for the U.N. Security Council
are mirrored by problems that human rights have created for international law
as whole. First, international human rights law has expanded the core of
international law itself, just as it has expanded the mandate of the U.N. Security
Council.
53. Meetings Coverage, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over
Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5
Abstentions, U.N. Press Releases SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011).
54. See Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change in
Libya, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 355, 397 (2012).
55. See Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and Economics, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J.
421, 434–35 (2014).
56. Roland Paris, Is it Possible to Meet the ‘Responsibility to Protect’?, WASH. POST (Dec. 9,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/09/is-it-possible-to-meetthe-responsibility-to-protect/?utm_term=.2a00c8847820 [https://perma.cc/8T2S-FTA3].
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The two primary sources of international legal obligations—treaties and
custom—have become broader over the past several decades, so that more and
more human rights are protected by binding international law.57 The success of
the effort is clear in one way: International law now regulates a vast array of
human-rights-related conduct. Today there are 64 human-rights-related
treaties, just counting those under the auspices of the United Nations and the
Council of Europe; those agreements have 1,377 human rights provisions.58
Not only are there lots of obligations, but they are often violated. One set
of commentators sympathetic to international human rights law has quipped:
“If human rights were a currency, its value would be in free fall.”59 This may
or may not be good for human rights, but the point I would like to make is a
different one: It involves this expansion’s potential effect on international law
as a whole.
Widespread violations of some legal norms may make it harder to enforce
others. As an analogy, consider the “broken windows” theory of crime
prevention, which posits that widespread violations of law, even mundane and
apparently trivial legal rules, lead to other, potentially more-serious violations
of law. Similarly, widespread violations of human rights law may signal that
no one cares about violations of international law as a whole. Accountability
is a fundamental concern of public international law because the system lacks
a centralized enforcement mechanism.
Whatever the “broken windows” argument suggests about policing,
behavior that signals a lack of accountability may be especially damaging to
international law writ large. As Michael Glennon writes, “The effect of
inefficacy is contagion: The entire legal system is discredited when prominent
rules are flagrantly violated.”60 It is not just that human rights law goes
unenforced; enforcement is also inconsistent, leading to perceptions of bias and
unfairness, which may, as I mentioned before, make countries less inclined to
enforce or follow international law as a whole.
That points us back to one of the topics I raised at the beginning of the
lecture: How can international law quell territorial conflict when international
law lacks a centralized enforcement mechanism?

57. See Wuerth, supra note 51, at 320–25; Jean d’Aspremont, Expansion and the Sources of
International Human Rights Law, in 46 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 223, 227–28 (2016).
58. See Jacob Mchangama & Guglielmo Verdirame, The Danger of Human Rights Proliferation,
FOREIGN AFF. (July 24, 2013), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2013-07-24/dangerhuman-rights-proliferation [https://perma.cc/MMD3-Q86T].
59. Id.
60. Glennon, supra note 27.
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International law works by making violations costly in some way for the
violator. Those costs can be in the form of sanctions imposed by other
countries; internalizations of the norm, which make the potential violator
unwilling to act counter to it; disapproval from the domestic constituencies
within the violating country; the withholding of benefits by other countries; or
even actions by the United Nations Security Council, as when Iraq invaded
Kuwait. But Security Council enforcement measures can be vetoed by any one
of the five permanent members, making these measures of limited
effectiveness.61 More important, generally, are the enforcement measures taken
by individual states and the concern by potential lawbreakers that violating
international law will lead to some kinds of costs. Two things are key to this
system of compliance: reputations of states for compliance and reputations of
states for punishing violators.
The point about human rights is this: States’ reputations for compliance and
for enforcing international law decrease as a whole when there are a large
number of unenforced international legal obligations.
Finally, let us return to the other topic I raised at the beginning of the
lecture. Recall my saying that democracies rarely go to war with each other. If
international law tends to make states more democratic, then it would appear to
contribute to peace among nations, at least based on what we know about the
conditions under which war was likely in the past. This observation suggests
that in order to secure peace among nations, international law should pursue
human rights, because human rights protections are associated with
democracies.
But “human rights” have only a weak relationship to “democracy” as
defined in the political science literature. It turns out that “democracy” as
measured by the democratic-peace literature is not the same as a human-rightsrespecting regime. The term democracy has three components: the ability of
citizens to express effective policy preferences, institutional constraints on
executive power, and civil liberties.62 But the empirical studies showing the
“democratic peace” do not measure civil liberties at all—so the vast majority
of these 1,377 international legal protections for human rights are not
necessarily associated with the democratic peace.
There is, however, an additional problem with the claim that international
human rights law has helped create the democratic peace. Even if human rights
are correlated with peace between some pairs of states, the extent to which
61. See Ingrid Wuerth, Compliance, in CONCEPTS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTRIBUTIONS
d’Aspremont & Sahib Singh eds., forthcoming 2018).
62. MONTY G. MARSHALL & KEITH JAGGERS, POLITY IV PROJECT: POLITICAL REGIME
CHARACTERISTICS AND TRANSITIONS, 1800–2002: DATASET USERS’ MANUAL 13 (2002).
TO DISCIPLINARY THOUGHT (Jean
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international human rights law generated or sustained those human rights is
especially difficult to assess.
The protection of human rights is provided for in an overlapping set of
domestic statutory and constitutional law around the world, as well as through
binding and nonbinding international legal instruments and regional human
rights instruments. The same is not true of international law that limits conflicts
over territory. The cornerstone of that system—indeed, the cornerstone of postWorld War II international law—is the prohibition on the use of force against
the territorial integrity of another state. This is not an issue meaningfully
regulated by domestic or soft international law.
That human rights are protected by many domestic and regional legal
instruments means that it may be possible to safeguard human rights without
using binding international law to do so. In other words, we can view the
human rights movement as tremendously successful at embedding human
rights into so many legal frameworks, even if we conclude that binding
international law should today be used largely to serve other purposes. Some
recent work on human-rights outcomes emphasizes the importance of iterative
engagement with international bodies as well as the importance of domestic
political conditions to securing human rights.63 Note that neither of these
conditions necessarily requires binding international legal norms to be
successful.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even as the world faces global financial uncertainty, cyber-insecurity,
terrorism, climate change, growing authoritarianism, and other risks, peace
among nations remains of fundamental importance. Indeed, threats to peace—
to say nothing of war itself—hinder our capacity to cooperate and make
progress on all these other global issues.
How to ensure peace among nations? Based on what we know about the
causes of war, it is likely that international law has contributed to what we call
the Long Peace by outlawing territorial conquests and putting in place other
rules that preserve territorial integrity and reduce conflict over borders. Today,

63. See, e.g., Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?:
Evidence from the Convention Against Torture 14–16 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of L., Working Paper No. 1555,
2016)
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cosettecreamer/files/creamersimmons_catselfreporting_feb2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MXE-MBU9]; Gráinne de Búrca, Human Rights Experimentalism, 111 AM. J.
INT’L L. 277, 299–304 (2017); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009).
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peace among nations is under threat from the rise of China, an emboldened
Russia, and the weakening of Western institutions and alliances.
But it is also under threat from an unexpected source: the rise of
international human rights law. Human rights law has sought to transform
sovereignty, to make state sovereignty conditional upon fulfilling states’
obligations to their own people. That objective is laudable, of course, but it
comes at a price. Weakening the territorial-based system of state sovereignty
unsurprisingly generates territorial uncertainty. States are less secure in their
borders if human rights can serve as the legal basis for armed attacks, regime
change, or providing support to separatist movements within another country’s
territory.
Human rights also tear at the system of international law as a whole. By
declaring a vast array of human rights to be protected through international law,
the hope over the past several decades was to harness the power of law, the
power of legal obligation to ensure that individual human rights are protected.
Again, a laudable goal.
But international law is not a strong system of law; it depends upon
decentralized enforcement, it depends upon reputations for compliance, and it
depends upon the United Nations and the Security Council. These are not
unlimited resources.
Human rights tear at the fabric of international law by designating as “law”
many, many obligations that are not enforced and that states are not serious
about enforcing—cheapening the currency of international law itself. They tear
at the fabric because the enforcement of international human rights law is
selective and political, leading to polarization and credibility costs. What is the
overall impact on peace among nations? That’s hard to measure.
But if international law is part of what has generated the Long Peace,
making international law weaker and less effective is a step away from peace,
not toward peace.
To create the conditions for peace among nations, international law should
refocus on a core set of legal obligations designed to facilitate international
cooperation and promote international peace and security.

